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The Capacity of Private Information Retrieval
Under Arbitrary Collusion Patterns
Xinyu Yao, Nan Liu, Wei Kang
Abstract
We study the private information retrieval (PIR) problem under arbitrary collusion pattern for
replicated databases. We find its capacity, which is the same as the capacity of the original PIR problem
with the number of databases N replaced by a number S∗, which is the optimal solution to a linear
programming problem that is a function of the collusion pattern. Hence, the collusion pattern affects
the capacity of the PIR problem only through the number S∗.
I. INTRODUCTION
The problem of private information retrieval (PIR) was first proposed in [1], where the user
wants to retrieve a certain bit out of K bits from N replicated databases without revealing
which bit is of interest to any single database. The design objective in [1] is to minimize the
upload cost and the download cost between the user and the databases. The PIR problem was
reformulated in [2] from an information-theoretic perspective, where the user wants to retrieve
a sufficiently large message from the databases so that the download cost is minimized. This
problem was fully solved by Sun and Jafar [2], where the capacity of the PIR problem was
shown to be
CPIR =
(
1 +
1
N
+
1
N2
+ · · ·+
1
NK−1
)−1
, (1)
which is defined as the ratio of the size of the desired message to the total number of downloaded
symbols from the databases. The capacity increases with the number of databases N , since with
the help of more databases, the privacy of the user can be hidden better from any single database.
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2Many interesting extensions and variations for the PIR problem have since then been studied
[3]–[98].
One of the first variations studied was that of the colluding databases [3], where some subsets
of databases may communicate and collude to learn about the message index that is of interest
to the user. To preserve privacy under possible collusion among databases, the number of
downloaded symbols needs to be increased. The first study on database collusion focused on the
case where we have replicated databases, i.e., each database stores a replica of the entirety of
the K files, and T -colluding databases, where it is assumed that up to T number of databases
may collude. Sun and Jafar [3] proved that the capacity of the T -colluding PIR problem for
replicated databases, is
CPIR =
(
1 +
T
N
+
(
T
N
)2
+ · · ·+
(
T
N
)K−1)−1
. (2)
Comparing (2) with (1), we see that when any T databases may collude, the number of effective
databases has decreased from N to N
T
, where N
T
does not need to be an integer.
Following [3], many extensions of T -colluding PIR have been studied [4]–[20], among which
MDS-coded databases with T -colluding generated a lot of research interest [4]–[10]. The MDS-
coded databases scenario is the case where the messages are encoded using an [N, J ] MDS code,
and the coded bits are stored in the N databases. Unlike the replicated databases scenario, where
each database has the ability to reconstruct all K messages, here, any J databases together can
reconstruct theK messages. Thus, the replicated databases scenario is a special case of the MDS-
coded databases scenario when J = 1. Finding the capacity of the T -colluding PIR problem
with MDS-coded databases is difficult, and remains open in general [4], [10].
While most works focused on the T -colluding structure of the databases, where any up to
T databases may collude, it is of interest to study more general collusion patterns due to the
possible heterogeneity of the databases. An arbitrary collusion pattern may be represented by
its maximal colluding sets [6], [7] as P = {T1, T2, · · · , TM}, where the databases in set Tm,
m ∈ [1 : M ] may collude, and there are M such colluding sets. Tajeddine et. al [6] proposed the
PIR problem under arbitrary collusion patterns and studied it for MDS-coded databases. Several
other works followed, including [14] for replicated databases, [7, Section VII] for MDS-coded
databases, and some discussions in [4, Appendix D], for both the replicated and MDS-coded
databases scenarios.
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3In this paper, we focus on the PIR problem under arbitrary collusion patterns for the replicated
databases scenario. The known results for this problem thus far is 1) the capacity for the special
case of disjoint colluding sets [14]; 2) the capacity for the special case of cyclically contiguous
databases [4, Appendix D]; 3) a rate of (2) is achievable for T , maxT ∈P |T |, i.e., we may
consider the more strict collusion pattern where any up to the maximum number of colluding
databases in P may collude. This is also the result we obtain when specializing [7] to the
replicated databases scenario; 4) a rate indicated by Theorem 2 in [6], specialized to the replicated
databases scenario by setting k = 1, is achievable. As can be seen, the understanding of the PIR
problem under arbitrary collusion patterns for replicated databases is still rather limited.
In this paper, we find the PIR capacity under arbitrary collusion patterns for the replicated
databases scenario. Though collusion patterns are diverse, and at first glance, the problem requires
a case-by-case analysis due to the property of each specific collusion pattern [7], we provide a
general formula for the PIR capacity that holds true for any collusion pattern P . The capacity
formula is shown to be
CP =
(
1 +
1
S∗
+
(
1
S∗
)2
+ · · ·+
(
1
S∗
)K−1)−1
, (3)
where S∗ is the optimal value of the following linear programming problem
max
y
1TNy
subject to BTPy ≤ 1M
y ≥ 0N ,
where BP is the incidence matrix, of size N ×M , of the collusion pattern P , i.e., if DB n is in
the m-th colluding set Tm in P , we let the (n,m)-th element of BP be 1, otherwise, it is zero.
1k (0k) is the column vector of size k whose elements are all one (zero). Comparing (3) with
(1) and (2), we find that the number of effective databases under arbitrary collusion pattern P
is S∗ which is related to the collusion pattern P through a linear programming solution.
The difficulty of finding the capacity of the PIR problem under arbitrary collusion patterns for
replicated databases comes from finding a common proof and capacity expressions that works
for any collusion pattern. Towards this end, the tools and ideas that we use in proving the
capacity result include 1) using the sub-modular property of the entropy function [99] to prove
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4a general inequality, which is used in place of Han’s inequality for T -colluding [3], for the
induction argument of the converse; 2) linking the achievable PIR rate and its converse to the
optimal solution of two linear programming problems; 3) using the duality of linear programming
problems to show that the achievability and converse results meet, yielding the capacity.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
Consider the problem where K messages are stored on N replicated databases. The K
messages, denoted as W1, · · · ,WK , are independent and each message consists of L symbols,
which are independently and uniformly distributed over a finite field Fq, where q is the size of
the field, i.e.,
H(Wk) = L, k = 1, ..., K, (4)
H(W1, ...,WK) = H(W1) +H(W2) + · · ·+H(WK).
A user wants to retrieve messageWθ, θ ∈ [1 : K], by sending designed queries to the databases,
where the query sent to the n-th databese is denoted as Q
[θ]
n . Since the queries are designed by
the user, who do not know the content of the messages, we have
I(W1:K ;Q
[θ]
1:N) = 0, ∀θ ∈ [1 : K]. (5)
Upon receiving the query Q
[θ]
n , Database n calculates the answer, denoted as A
[θ]
n , based on the
query received Q
[θ]
n and the messages W1:K , i.e.,
H(A[θ]n |Q
[θ]
n ,W1:K) = 0, ∀n ∈ [1 : N ], θ ∈ [1 : K]. (6)
The queries need to be designed such that the user is able to reconstruct the desired message
Wθ from all the answers received from the databases, i.e.,
H(Wθ|A
[θ]
1:N , Q
[θ]
1:N) = 0, ∀θ ∈ [1 : K]. (7)
The queries also need to be designed such that the privacy of the user is preserved. In this paper,
we consider colluding databases, and furthermore, the collusion pattern can be arbitrary. We
represent the collusion pattern as P = {T1, T2, · · · , TM}, where M is the number of colluding
sets and Tm ⊆ [1 : N ], ∀m ∈ [1 : M ] is the m-th colluding set in P . The representation
P means that the databases in set Tm may collude, and there are M such colluding sets. As
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5an example, for N = 4 databases, the 2-colluding case considered by [3] is denoted as P =
{{1, 2}, {1, 3}, {1, 4}, {2, 3}, {2, 4}, {3, 4}}, and the disjoint collusion pattern considered in [14]
would cover cases such as P = {{1}, {2, 3}, {3, 4}, {2, 4}}, P = {{1, 2}, {3, 4}} etc. Note that
the defined collusion pattern P satisfy the following two constraints: 1) we only include the
maximal colluding set as elements of P . For example, if {1, 2, 3} ∈ P , then by definition, {1, 2}
is a colluding set too. But we do not include {1, 2} in P for ease of representation; 2) all
databases must appear in at least one element of P , because at the very least, the privacy of
the user must be preserved at each single database, which is the requirement of the original PIR
problem [2].
To protect the privacy of the user, we require that databases that are in a colluding set can
not learn anything about the desired message index θ, i.e.,
(Q
[1]
T , A
[1]
T ,W1:K) ∼ (Q
[θ]
T , A
[θ]
T ,W1:K), ∀θ ∈ [1 : K], ∀T ∈ P. (8)
The rate of the PIR problem with collusion pattern P , denoted as RP , is defined as the ratio
between the message size L and the total number of downloaded information from the databases,
i.e.,
RP =
L∑N
n=1H(A
[θ]
n )
, (9)
which is not a function of θ due to the privacy constraint in (8). The capacity of the PIR problem
with collusion pattern P is CP = supRP , where the supremum is over all possible retrieval
schemes.
We define an incidence matrix BP , of size N ×M , to describe the collusion pattern P , where
if DB n is in the m-th colluding set in P , we let the (n,m)-th element of BP be 1, otherwise,
it is zero. For example, P = {{1, 2}, {2, 3}, {2, 4}, {1, 3, 4}} would correspond to an incidence
matrix of
BP =


1 0 0 1
1 1 1 0
0 1 0 1
0 0 1 1

 .
Throughout the paper, we will denote the k × 1 column vector of all ones as 1k, and the k × 1
column vector of all zeros as 0k. Ik is the size k×k identity matrix and when the size is evident,
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6we write it as I. Similarly, 0k×i is the size k× i matrix of all zeros, and when the size is evident,
we write it as 0.
III. MAIN RESULTS
The main result of the paper is the PIR capacity under arbitrary collusion patterns for replicated
databases, as shown in the next theorem.
Theorem 1 The capacity of the PIR problem under collusion pattern P for replicated databases
is
CP =
(
1 +
1
S∗
+
(
1
S∗
)2
+ · · ·+
(
1
S∗
)K−1)−1
, (10)
where S∗ is the optimal value of the following linear programming problem, which we will call
(LP1),
(LP1) max
y
1TNy
subject to BTPy ≤ 1M (11)
y ≥ 0N , (12)
where BP is the incidence matrix, of size N ×M , of the collusion pattern P .
Theorem 1 will be proved in the following section. We will first show that (10) is achievable
when the amount of data queried to each database is proportional to the optimal solution y∗ of
(LP1). Next, we present a converse theorem where the upper bound on capacity has the same
form as (10) with S∗ replaced by S2, and S2 is the optimal value of another linear programming
problem (LP2). Finally, we show that (LP1) and (LP2) are dual problems, which means S∗ = S2.
This concludes the proof that (10) is the capacity of the PIR problem under arbitrary collusion
patterns for replicated databases.
We make a few remarks here regarding the main result.
Remark 1 Theorem 1 shows that the arbitrary collusion pattern P affects the capacity of the PIR
problem only through the linear programming problem (LP1). More specifically, the capacity
formula under arbitrary collusion patterns take on the same form as that of the original PIR
problem of (1), with N replaced by the optimal solution of (LP1).
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7Remark 2 Our results coincide with known capacity results of PIR colluding for replicated
databases:
1) In the case of non-colluding databases [2], the collusion pattern is P = {{1}, {2}, · · · , {N}},
whose incidence matrix is BP = IN . It is straightforward to see that the optimal solution
to (LP1) is y∗ = 1N , and the corresponding optimal value S
∗ = N . Hence, the capacity
formula in (10) becomes (1), consistent with [2].
2) In the case of T -colluding databases [3], the collusion pattern P consists of all size T
subsets of [1 : N ], and there are a total of
(
N
T
)
many colluding sets, i.e., M =
(
N
T
)
.
The corresponding incidence matrix of size N ×M consists of
(
N
T
)
columns, each with
T number of 1s and N − T number of 0s. It is straightforward to see that the optimal
solution to (LP1) is y∗ = 1
T
1N , and the corresponding optimal value S
∗ = N
T
. Hence, the
capacity formula in (10) becomes (2), consistent with [3].
3) In the case T -colluding cyclically contiguous databases [4, Appendix D], the collusion
pattern is P = {{1, 2, · · · , T}, {2, 3, · · · , T + 1}, · · · , {N, 1, 2, · · · , T − 1}}, where M =
N . The transpose of the corresponding incidence matrix, i.e., BTP , is a circulant matrix,
where the first row consists of T number of 1s followed by N − T number of 0s. It
is straightforward to see that though the incidence matrix is different than that of the T -
colluding case, the optimal solution y∗, and hence the optimal value S∗, is the same. Thus,
the capacity formula in (10) becomes (2), consistent with [4, Appendix D].
4) In the case of disjoint colluding set [14], the N servers are split into J disjoint sets, where
Set j consists of Nj databases, j ∈ [1 : J ]. Within Set j, up to Tj databases may collude,
where Tj ≤ Nj . The corresponding incidence matrix to this collusion pattern is
BP =


B1 0 · · · 0
0 B2 · · · 0
...
...
...
...
0 0 · · · BJ

 ,
where Bj is an Nj ×
(
Nj
Tj
)
matrix, with each column consisting of Tj 1s and Nj − Tj
0s, j ∈ [1 : J ]. It is straightforward to see that the optimal solution to (LP1) is y∗ =[ 1
T1
· · ·
1
T1︸ ︷︷ ︸
N1
1
T2
· · ·
1
T2︸ ︷︷ ︸
N2
· · ·
1
TJ
· · ·
1
TJ︸ ︷︷ ︸
NJ
]T
. The corresponding optimal value S∗ =
∑J
j=1
Nj
Tj
.
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8Hence, the capacity formula in (10) becomes
(
1 +
(∑J
j=1
Nj
Tj
)−1
+
(∑J
j=1
Nj
Tj
)−2
+ · · ·
+
(∑J
j=1
Nj
Tj
)−(K−1))−1
, consistent with [14, Theorem 2].
IV. PROOFS
A. Achievability
Recall that for each collusion pattern P , there is a corresponding incidence matrix BP , as
defined in Section II. Let y =
[
y1 y2 · · · yN
]T
be a feasible and rational solution of (LP1),
i.e., y consists of rational elements, and it satisfies the constraints (11) and (12). Let the value
of the objective function in (LP1) corresponding to y be S, i.e., S =
∑N
n=1 yn. Then, we have
the following achievability theorem.
Theorem 2 Consider the PIR problem with collusion pattern P , whose incidence matrix is BP .
Suppose y is a rational and feasible solution of (LP1) and S = 1TNy. Then the following rate
is achievable, i.e.,
CP ≥
(
1 +
1
S
+
(
1
S
)2
+ · · ·+
(
1
S
)K−1)−1
. (13)
Proof: The details of the proof of Theorem 2, along with an illustrative example, is provided
in Appendix A. The proof follows very similarly to [3, Section IV.D], and we note the difference
here: 1) In place of NK in [3, Section IV.D], we have L, which is the message length. L will
be chosen such that the number of k-sum symbols downloaded from each of the databases is
an integer, k ∈ [1 : K]. Such an L can be found since y is rational. 2) In place of N
T
in [3,
Section IV.D], we have S. 3) Rather than distributing the queries evenly among all databases, we
distribute the queries among the databases proportionally according to (y, S), more specifically,
the number of queries to Database n is based on the proportion yn
S
, n ∈ [1 : N ].
Remark 3 The main novelty in our achievable scheme is, rather than distributing the queries
evenly among all databases, we propose distributing the queries proportionally according to
(y, S), i.e., the number of queries to Database n is based on the proportion yn
S
, n ∈ [1 : N ].
First of all, this is possible because y satisfies the constraint in (12), which means yn ≥ 0,
n ∈ [1 : N ]. Secondly, y that satisfies the constraint (11) will gurantee the user’s privacy. This
can be intuitively explained as follows: the databases in each colluding Tm ∈ P can not request
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9too many symbols, i.e., the m-th element of BTPy is no greater than 1, otherwise, the dependency
of the undesired symbols will be revealed to the colluding databases in Tm, violating the privacy
of the user.
Remark 4 It is easy to see that y = 1
N
1N is a feasible and rational solution. The corresponding
S = 1TNy = 1. This is the suboptimal retrieval scheme of downloading all K messages, evenly
from all the databases.
Note that the right-hand side of (13) is an increasing function of S. Based on the result
of Theorem 2, to find the largest possible achievable rate, we should find the maximum S =∑N
n=1 yn achievable over all y satisfying (11) and (12). Applying Theorem 2 for the optimal
solution of (LP1), i.e., (y∗, S∗), and noting that y∗ is rational due to the fact that the objective
function and the linear constraints in (LP1) are both with integer coefficients, the rate of Theorem
1 is achievable.
B. Converse
Recall that for each collusion pattern P , there is a corresponding incidence matrix BP , as
defined in Section II. Consider the following linear programming problem, which will be called
(LP2),
(LP2) min
x
1TMx
subject to BPx ≥ 1N (14)
x ≥ 0M . (15)
Let x =
[
x1 x2 · · · xM
]T
be a feasible and rational solution of (LP2), i.e., x consists of
rational elements, and it satisfies the constraints (14) and (15). Let the value of the objective
function in (LP2) corresponding to x be S2, i.e., S2 =
∑M
m=1 xm. We have the following converse
theorem.
Theorem 3 Consider the PIR problem with collusion pattern P , whose incidence matrix is BP .
Suppose x is a rational and feasible solution of (LP2) and S2 = 1
T
Mx. Then, the capacity of the
January 14, 2020 DRAFT
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PIR problem is upper bounded by
CP ≤
(
1 +
1
S2
+
(
1
S2
)2
+ · · ·+
(
1
S2
)K−1)−1
. (16)
Proof: The details of the proof is provided in Appendix B. We comment on the main
idea here. Using standard PIR converse techniques such as those in [2], we can obtain for
k = 2, 3, · · · , K,
H(A
[k−1]
1:N |W1:k−1, Q
[k−1]
1:N ) ≥ H(A
[k]
Tm
|W1:k−1, Q
[k]
1:N), m = 1, 2, · · · ,M. (17)
For each m ∈ [1 : M ], multiply both sides of (17) by xm, which is the m-th element of x. Note
that x satisfies (15), which means that we are multiplying non-negative numbers and the sign
of the inequality does not need to be changed. Then, adding all these M inequalities together,
we obtain
S2 ·H(A
[k−1]
1:N |W1:k−1, Q
[k−1]
1:N ) ≥
M∑
m=1
xmH(A
[k]
Tm
|W1:k−1, Q
[k]
1:N), (18)
where we have used the definition of S2, i.e., S2 =
∑M
m=1 xm. The fact that x is rational and
non-negative means that there exist non-negative integers G1
x
, G2
x
,· · · , GM
x
, Gx, such that each
xm can be expressed as xm =
Gmx
Gx
, m ∈ [1 : M ]. Thus, we have
Gx
M∑
m=1
xmH(A
[k]
Tm
|W1:k−1, Q
[k]
1:N) =
M∑
m=1
Gm
x
H(A
[k]
Tm
|W1:k−1, Q
[k]
1:N). (19)
Since Gm
x
, m ∈ [1 : M ] are integers, the right-hand side of (19) can be written as a summation
of the form
V∑
v=1
H(A
[k]
T˜v
|W1:k−1, Q
[k]
1:N), (20)
where V is a positive integer, and T˜v ⊆ [1 : N ], for v ∈ [1 : V ].
We have the following results for a summation of the form (20): we say that the summation
in (20) satisfies the even property with the number G, if the number of times n appears in
A , {T˜1, T˜2, · · · T˜V } is equal to G for each n ∈ [1 : N ]. For a summation that satisfies the even
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property, we have
V∑
v=1
H(A
[k]
T˜v
|W1:k−1, Q
[k]
1:N) ≥ G ·H(A
[k]
1:N |W1:k−1, Q
[k]
1:N), k = 2, 3, · · · , K, (21)
which follows by applying the sub-modular property of the entropy function multiple times.
In the case of BPx = 1N , the sum on the right-hand side of (19) satisfies the even property
with G = Gx. In the case of BPx > 1N , after writing the right-hand side of (19) in the form
of (20), we may delete some indices of n in sets T˜1, T˜2, · · · T˜V , until each n appears only Gx
number of times. This gives us a lower bound to the right-hand side of (19), and this lower
bound is a summation that satisfies the even property with the number Gx. Hence, for all cases
of BPx ≥ 1N , we have
M∑
m=1
Gm
x
H(A
[k]
Tm
|W1:k−1, Q
[k]
1:N ) ≥ GxH(A
[k]
1:N |W1:k−1, Q
[k]
1:N), k = 2, 3, · · · , K. (22)
Utilizing (18), (19) and (22), we may obtain the induction argument
S2H(A
[k−1]
1:N |W1:k−1, Q
[k−1]
1:N ) ≥ L+H(A
[k]
1:N |W1:k, Q
[k]
1:N), k = 2, 3, · · · , K,
from which the result of Theorem 3 follows from standard PIR converse techniques such as
those in [2].
Remark 5 The main novelty of our converse proof is proving (22), which is used in place of
Han’s inequality for T -colluding [3], for the induction argument of the converse. We show that
when x satisfies constraints (14) and (15), the sum corresponding to x either satisfies the even
property or a lower bound of it satisfies the even property, resulting in (22).
The reason why x has to satisfy (14), (15) and is rational is stated in the proof main idea
above. Note that the right-hand side of (16) is an increasing function of S2. Based on the
result of Theorem 3, to find the tightest possible upper bound, we should find the minimum
S2 =
∑M
m=1 xm achievable over all x satisfying (14) and (15). Applying Theorem 3 for the
optimal solution of (LP2), i.e., (x∗, S∗2), and noting that x
∗ is rational due to the fact that the
objective function and linear constraints in (LP2) are both with integer coefficients, we have
CP ≤
(
1 +
1
S∗2
+
(
1
S∗2
)2
+ · · ·+
(
1
S∗2
)K−1)−1
.
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C. Capacity
In Sections IV-A and IV-B, we have shown that the capacity lower and upper bounds are
related to the optimal solutions of two linear programming problems (LP1) and (LP2), i.e., we
have(
1 +
1
S∗
+
(
1
S∗
)2
+ · · ·+
(
1
S∗
)K−1)−1
≤ CP ≤
(
1 +
1
S∗2
+
(
1
S∗2
)2
+ · · ·+
(
1
S∗2
)K−1)−1
,
where S∗ and S∗2 are the optimal solutions to (LP1) and (LP2), respectively. It is easy to see that
(LP1) and (LP2) are actually dual problems of each other, which means S∗ = S∗2 . Hence, we
have found the capacity of the PIR problem under arbitrary collusion pattern P for replicated
databases, as described in Theorem 1.
V. SOME EXAMPLES
To aid in a better understanding of the PIR problem under arbitrary collusion patterns for
replicated databases, we provide several examples. For ease of understanding, we let K = 2
messages in all examples.
A. N = 5 and P1 = {{1, 2, 3}, {1, 4}, {2, 4}, {3, 4}, {5}}
The corresponding incidence matrix is
BP1 =


1 1 0 0 0
1 0 1 0 0
1 0 0 1 0
0 1 1 1 0
0 0 0 0 1


.
The optimal solution to (LP1) is y∗ =
[
1
3
1
3
1
3
2
3
1
]T
and the corresponding optimal value
is 8
3
. The optimal solution to (LP2) is x∗ =
[
2
3
1
3
1
3
1
3
1
]T
and the corresponding optimal
value is also 8
3
.
The achievability scheme is as follows: let the message size L = 64. Further let U1 and
U2 ∈ F64×64q be two random matrices chosen privately by the user, independently and uniformly
January 14, 2020 DRAFT
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among all 64 × 64 full-rank matrices over Fq. Suppose the desired message is W1, then the
encoding becomes
a[1:64] = U1W1,
b[1:64] = MDS64×24U2 [(1 : 24), :]W2.
The query structure is shown in Table I.
TABLE I
QUERY TABLE FOR N = 5, K = 2 AND COLLUSION PATTERN P1 CORRESPONDING TO y
∗
DB 1 DB 2 DB3 DB4 DB 5
a1, a2, a3 a4, a5, a6 a7, a8, a9 a10, a11, a12 a16, a17, a18
a13, a14, a15 a19, a20, a21
a22, a23, a24
b1, b2, b3 b4, b5, b6 b7, b8, b9 b10, b11, b12 b16, b17, b18
b13, b14, b15 b19, b20, b21
b22, b23, b24
a25 + b25 a30 + b30 a35 + b35 a40 + b40 a50 + b50
...
...
...
...
...
a29 + b29 a34 + b34 a39 + b39 a44 + b44 a54 + b54
a45 + b45 a55 + b55
...
...
a49 + b49 a59 + b59
a60 + b60
...
a64 + b64
The decoding constraint and the achievable rate of
(
1 + 3
8
)−1
is simple to check. As for the
privacy constraint, for colluding set {1, 2, 3}, the 3 databases together see 24 as and 24 bs. Due
to the (64, 24) MDS code used, these three databases when colluding sees 24 independent as
and 24 independent bs, and thus, they can not tell if a or b is the desired message. This holds true
for colluding sets {1, 4}, {2, 4}, {3, 4} as well. Each colluding set sees 24 independent as and
24 independent bs. As for Database 5, who do not collude with anyone, it sees 24 independent
as and 24 independent bs by itself. So from this example, we can see that the databases who
collude more with others will be queried less, and the databases who collude less with others
will get queried more. The heterogeneity of the collusion pattern naturally results in asymmetric
database downloading.
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As for the converse, according to x∗ =
[
2
3
1
3
1
3
1
3
1
]T
, choose Gx∗ = 3, G
1
x∗
= 2,
G2
x∗
= G3
x∗
= G4
x∗
= 1 and G5
x∗
= 3. For this example, the proof of the key step (22) is as
follows:
2H(A
[2]
{1,2,3}|W1, Q
[2]
1:N) +H(A
[2]
{1,4}|W1, Q
[2]
1:N ) +H(A
[2]
{2,4}|W1, Q
[2]
1:N)
+H(A
[2]
{3,4}|W1, Q
[2]
1:N) + 3H(A
[2]
{5}|W1, Q
[2]
1:N) (23)
≥H(A
[2]
{1,2,3,4}|W1, Q
[2]
1:N) +H(A
[2]
{1,2,3}|W1, Q
[2]
1:N ) +H(A
[2]
{1}|W1, Q
[2]
1:N) +H(A
[2]
{2,4}|W1, Q
[2]
1:N)
+H(A
[2]
{3,4}|W1, Q
[2]
1:N) + 3H(A
[2]
{5}|W1, Q
[2]
1:N)
≥H(A
[2]
[1:5]|W1, Q
[2]
1:N) +H(A
[2]
{1,2,3}|W1, Q
[2]
1:N) +H(A
[2]
{1}|W1, Q
[2]
1:N) +H(A
[2]
{2,4}|W1, Q
[2]
1:N)
+H(A
[2]
{3,4}|W1, Q
[2]
1:N) + 2H(A
[2]
{5}|W1, Q
[2]
1:N)
≥H(A
[2]
[1:5]|W1, Q
[2]
1:N) +H(A
[2]
{1,2,3,4}|W1, Q
[2]
1:N) +H(A
[2]
{1}|W1, Q
[2]
1:N) +H(A
[2]
{2}|W1, Q
[2]
1:N)
+H(A
[2]
{3,4}|W1, Q
[2]
1:N) + 2H(A
[2]
{5}|W1, Q
[2]
1:N)
≥2H(A
[2]
[1:5]|W1, Q
[2]
1:N) +H(A
[2]
{1}|W1, Q
[2]
1:N) +H(A
[2]
{2}|W1, Q
[2]
1:N)
+H(A
[2]
{3,4}|W1, Q
[2]
1:N) +H(A
[2]
{5}|W1, Q
[2]
1:N)
≥3H(A
[2]
[1:5]|W1, Q
[2]
1:N). (24)
As can be seen, the sum in (23) satisfies the even property, and therefore, utilizing the sub-
modular property of the entropy function multiple times, will give us (24).
This example is a representation of collusion patterns where the optimal solutions y∗ and x∗
to (LP1) and (LP2) both satisfy the constraints (11) and (14) with equality. The key feature of
such collusion patterns are 1) each colluding set of databases are queried with the maximum
number of independent bits. 2) the summation of the left-hand side of (22), corresponding to
the optimal x∗, satisfies the even property.
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B. N = 5, P2 = {{1, 3, 4}, {2, 3, 4}, {1, 3, 5}, {2, 3, 5}, {1, 4, 5}, {2, 4, 5}, {3, 4, 5}}
The corresponding incidence matrix is
BP2 =


1 0 1 0 1 0 0
0 1 0 1 0 1 0
1 1 1 1 0 0 1
1 1 0 0 1 1 1
0 0 1 1 1 1 1


.
The optimal solution to (LP1) is y∗ =
[
1 1 0 0 0
]T
and the corresponding optimal value
is 2. The optimal solution to (LP2) is x∗ =
[
1
3
1
3
1
3
1
3
1
3
1
3
0
]T
and the corresponding
optimal value is also 2. Note here that BTP2y = 1M has a unique non-negative solution y0 =[
1
3
1
3
1
3
1
3
1
3
]T
, yielding a cost function of 1TNy0 =
5
3
, however, it is not the optimal solution
to (LP1).
Consider the following two achievability schemes, the first one corresponds to y0 and the
second one corresponds to y∗. The achievability scheme corresponding to y0 is as follows: let
the message size L = 25. Further let U1 and U2 ∈ F25×25q be two random matrices chosen
privately by the user, independently and uniformly among all 25 × 25 full-rank matrices over
Fq. Suppose the desired message is W1, then the encoding becomes
a[1:25] = U1W1,
b[1:25] = MDS25×15U2 [(1 : 15), :]W2.
The query structure is shown in Table II.
TABLE II
QUERY TABLE FOR N = 5, K = 2 AND COLLUSION PATTERN P2 CORRESPONDING TO y0
DB 1 DB 2 DB3 DB4 DB 5
a1, a2, a3 a4, a5, a6 a7, a8, a9 a10, a11, a12 a13, a14, a15
b1, b2, b3 b4, b5, b6 b7, b8, b9 b10, b11, b12 b13, b14, b15
a16 + b16 a17 + b17 a18 + b18 a19 + b19 a20 + b20
a21 + b21 a22 + b22 a23 + b23 a24 + b24 a25 + b25
Each colluding set in P2 consists of three databases, and they each see 15 independent as and
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15 independent bs. So this scheme satisfy the feature that each colluding set of databases are
queried with the maximum number of independent bits.
The achievability scheme corresponding to the optimal y∗ =
[
1 1 0 0 0
]T
, i.e., an optimal
query scheme, is to let the message size L = 4. Further let U1 and U2 ∈ F4×4q be two random
matrices chosen privately by the user, independently and uniformly among all 4 × 4 full-rank
matrices over Fq. Suppose the desired message is W1, then the encoding becomes
a[1:4] = U1W1,
b[1:4] = MDS4×2U2 [(1 : 2), :]W2.
The query structure is shown in Table III, where Databases 3 to 5 will not be queried. When
Databases 3 to 5 are not queried, from collusion pattern P2, we can see that only Databases
1 and 2 are left and they do not collude with each other. So the achievability scheme is just
N = 2 databases with no colluding. In the above optimal query scheme, since BTPy
∗ > 1M ,
TABLE III
QUERY TABLE FOR N = 5, K = 2 AND COLLUSION PATTERN P2 CORRESPONDING TO y
∗
DB 1 DB 2 DB3 DB4 DB 5
a1 a2
b1 b2
a3 + b3 a4 + b4
not all colluding sets get queried the maximum number of independent bits, which is 2. More
specifically, colluding set {3, 4, 5} does not get queried at all.
Comparing the two achievable schemes, we notice that the first achievable scheme has the
feature that each colluding set is queried the maximum number of independent bits, and the
second one does not. At first glance, it looks like the first scheme is better as it uses each
database to the maximal extent. But in fact, the second one is optimal. Hence, we conclude that
the optimal scheme does not necessarily have the following feature: each colluding set is queried
with the maximum number of independent bits.
As for the converse, according to x∗ =
[
1
3
1
3
1
3
1
3
1
3
1
3
0
]T
, choose Gx∗ = 3, G
1
x∗
=
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· · · = G6
x∗
= 1 and G7
x∗
= 0. For this example, the proof of the key step (22) is as follows:
H(A
[2]
{1,3,4}|W1, Q
[2]
1:N) +H(A
[2]
{2,3,4}|W1, Q
[2]
1:N ) +H(A
[2]
{1,3,5}|W1, Q
[2]
1:N)
+H(A
[2]
{2,3,5}|W1, Q
[2]
1:N) +H(A
[2]
{1,4,5}|W1, Q
[2]
1:N) +H(A
[2]
{2,4,5}|W1, Q
[2]
1:N) (25)
≥H(A
[2]
{1}|W1, Q
[2]
1:N) +H(A
[2]
{2,3,4}|W1, Q
[2]
1:N) +H(A
[2]
{1,3}|W1, Q
[2]
1:N)
+H(A
[2]
{2,3,5}|W1, Q
[2]
1:N) +H(A
[2]
{1,4,5}|W1, Q
[2]
1:N) +H(A
[2]
{2,4,5}|W1, Q
[2]
1:N) (26)
≥H(A
[2]
{1}|W1, Q
[2]
1:N) +H(A
[2]
{1,2,3,4}|W1, Q
[2]
1:N) +H(A
[2]
{3}|W1, Q
[2]
1:N)
+H(A
[2]
{2,3,5}|W1, Q
[2]
1:N) +H(A
[2]
{1,4,5}|W1, Q
[2]
1:N) +H(A
[2]
{2,4,5}|W1, Q
[2]
1:N)
≥H(A
[2]
{1}|W1, Q
[2]
1:N) +H(A
[2]
[1:5]|W1, Q
[2]
1:N ) +H(A
[2]
{3}|W1, Q
[2]
1:N)
+H(A
[2]
{2,3}|W1, Q
[2]
1:N) +H(A
[2]
{1,4,5}|W1, Q
[2]
1:N) +H(A
[2]
{2,4,5}|W1, Q
[2]
1:N )
≥H(A
[2]
{1}|W1, Q
[2]
1:N) + 2H(A
[2]
[1:5]|W1, Q
[2]
1:N) +H(A
[2]
{3}|W1, Q
[2]
1:N)
+H(A
[2]
{2,4,5}|W1, Q
[2]
1:N)
≥3H(A
[2]
[1:5]|W1, Q
[2]
1:N). (27)
Note that the sum in (25) does not satisfy the even property, and we need to drop some indices so
that each index n ∈ [1 : 5] appears Gx∗ number of times before we can utilize the sub-modular
property of the entropy function. This is why we have the lower bound (26) where we have
dropped indices 3, 4 and 5 once each. Now, (26) satisfies the even property, and we may utilize
the sub-modular property of the entropy function multiple times to obtain (27).
Note the complementary slackness conditions in this example. On one hand, we have BTPy
∗ =[
1 1 1 1 1 1 0
]T
, which means x∗7 = 0. So the colluding set {3, 4, 5} does not appear in
the converse, and the converse is derived as if colluding set {3, 4, 5} does not exist, which is still
a converse. This intuitively explains why even though the colluding set {3, 4, 5} does not get
queried the maximum number of independent bits, Table II is still an optimal achievable scheme.
On the other hand, we haveBPx
∗ =
[
1 1 4
3
4
3
4
3
]T
, which means y∗3 = y
∗
4 = y
∗
5 = 0. Hence,
in the optimal achievability scheme, we do not use Databases 3,4 and 5 to transmit anything.
This also intuitively explains why we may drop some of the indices of 3, 4 and 5 in the converse
proof of (26) and have the converse to still be tight.
The converse proof of not writing {3, 4, 5} in (25) and dropping some of the indices 3, 4 and 5
in (26) means that the converse proof is equivalent to the collusion pattern ofN = 5 databases and
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P ′2 = {{1}, {2, 3, 4}, {1, 3}, {2, 3, 5}, {1, 4, 5}, {2, 4, 5}} = {{2, 3, 4}, {1, 3}, {2, 3, 5}, {1, 4, 5},
{2, 4, 5}}, which is a milder collusion pattern than P2. The achievability proof of not querying
Databases 3, 4 and 5 means that the achievability proof is equivalent to the collusion pattern
N = 2 databases and P ′′2 = {{1}, {2}}. So the collusion patterns P2,P
′
2,P
′′
2 are in fact equivalent
in terms of capacity, which means that for P2 and P
′
2, the collusion is so extensive for Databases
3, 4 and 5, that we may as well not use them and use Databases 1 and 2 only, since these two
are not colluding with each other.
C. N = 7, P3 = {{1, 4}, {2, 5}, {1, 2, 3, 6}, {3, 7}, {4, 5, 6, 7}
The corresponding incidence matrix is
BP3 =


1 0 1 0 0
0 1 1 0 0
0 0 1 1 0
1 0 0 0 1
0 1 0 0 1
0 0 1 0 1
0 0 0 1 1


.
The optimal solution to (LP1) is y∗ =
[
1
3
1
3
1
3
1
3
1
3
0 1
3
]T
and the corresponding optimal
value is 2. The optimal solution to (LP2) is x∗ =
[
0 0 1 0 1
]T
and the corresponding
optimal value is also 2. Note here that BP3x = 1N has a unique non-negative solution x0 =[
1
2
1
2
1
2
1
2
1
2
]T
, yielding a cost function of 1TMx0 =
5
2
, however, it is not the optimal solution
to (LP2).
In the following, we derive two converses, the first one is based on x0 and the second one is
based on x∗. The converse according to x0 =
[
1
2
1
2
1
2
1
2
1
2
]T
is as follows: choose Gx0 =
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2, G1
x0
= · · ·G5
x0
= 1, we have the following proof for the key step of (22),
H(A
[2]
{1,4}|W1, Q
[2]
1:N ) +H(A
[2]
{2,5}|W1, Q
[2]
1:N) +H(A
[2]
{1,2,3,6}|W1, Q
[2]
1:N)
+H(A
[2]
{3,7}|W1, Q
[2]
1:N) +H(A
[2]
{4,5,6,7}|W1, Q
[2]
1:N) (28)
≥H(A
[2]
{1,2,4,5}|W1, Q
[2]
1:N) +H(A
[2]
{1,2,3,6}|W1, Q
[2]
1:N) +H(A
[2]
{3,7}|W1, Q
[2]
1:N)
+H(A
[2]
{4,5,6,7}|W1, Q
[2]
1:N)
≥H(A
[2]
{1,2,3,4,5,6}|W1, Q
[2]
1:N) +H(A
[2]
{1,2}|W1, Q
[2]
1:N) +H(A
[2]
{3,7}|W1, Q
[2]
1:N)
+H(A
[2]
{4,5,6,7}|W1, Q
[2]
1:N)
≥H(A
[2]
[1:7]|W1, Q
[2]
1:N) +H(A
[2]
{1,2}|W1, Q
[2]
1:N) +H(A
[2]
{3}|W1, Q
[2]
1:N)
+H(A
[2]
{4,5,6,7}|W1, Q
[2]
1:N)
≥2H(A
[2]
[1:7]|W1, Q
[2]
1:N).
Since we have BP3x0 = 1N , the sum in (28) satisfies the even property.
The converse according to x∗ =
[
0 0 1 0 1
]T
is as follows: pick Gx∗ = 1, G
1
x∗
= G2
x∗
=
G4
x∗
= 0, G3
x∗
= G5
x∗
= 1, we have the following proof for the key step of (22),
H(A
[2]
{1,2,3,6}|W1, Q
[2]
1:N) +H(A
[2]
{4,5,6,7}|W1, Q
[2]
1:N) (29)
≥H(A
[2]
{1,2,3}|W1, Q
[2]
1:N) +H(A
[2]
{4,5,6,7}|W1, Q
[2]
1:N) (30)
≥H(A
[2]
[1:7]|W1, Q
[2]
1:N),
where (29) does not satisfy the even property, and we drop 6 once to obtain (30) which satisfies
the even property.
When comparing the two converses, the second one seems looser as it involves a dropping
of 6. However, the second one is in fact tighter as it gives a smaller S, which is the sum of the
elements of x. This example shows that even if the collusion pattern is such that there exists
a sum with the even property, it is not necessarily the tightest converse to use. So the optimal
scheme does not necessarily have the following feature: the summation of the left-hand side of
(22) satisfies the even property.
The achievability scheme corresponding to y∗ is as follows: let the message size L = 12.
Further let U1 and U2 ∈ F12×12q be two random matrices chosen privately by the user, indepen-
dently and uniformly among all 12×12 full-rank matrices over Fq. Suppose the desired message
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is W1, then the encoding becomes
a[1:12] = U1W1,
b[1:12] = MDS12×6U2 [(1 : 6), :]W2.
The query structure is shown in Table IV.
TABLE IV
QUERY TABLE FOR N = 5, K = 2 AND COLLUSION PATTERN P3 CORRESPONDING TO y
∗
DB 1 DB 2 DB3 DB4 DB 5 DB 6 DB 7
a1 a2 a3 a4 a5 a6
b1 b2 b3 b4 b5 b6
a7 + b7 a8 + b8 a9 + b9 a10 + b10 a11 + b11 a12 + b12
Colluding sets {1, 4}, {2, 5}, {3, 7} each sees only 4 independent as and bs. Colluding sets
{1, 2, 3, 6} and {4, 5, 6, 7} each sees 6 independent as and bs, where Database 6 does not get
queried at all because it colludes with many databases.
Note the complementary slackness conditions in this example. On one hand, we have BTPy
∗ =[
2
3
2
3
1 2
3
1
]T
, which means x∗1 = x
∗
2 = x
∗
4 = 0. So the colluding sets {1, 4}, {2, 5}, {3, 7}
do not appear in the converse, and the converse is derived as if colluding sets {1, 4}, {2, 5}, {3, 7}
do not exist, which is still a converse. This intuitively explains why even though the colluding
sets {1, 4}, {2, 5}, {3, 7} do not get queried the maximum number of independent bits, Table IV
is still an optimal achievable scheme. These colluding sets are not the bottleneck. On the other
hand, we have BPx
∗ =
[
1 1 1 1 1 2 1
]T
, which means y∗6 = 0. Hence, in the optimal
achievability scheme, we do not use Database 6 to transmit anything. This also intuitively explains
why we may drop one of indices 6 in the converse proof of (30) and have the converse to still
be tight.
The converse proof of not writing {1, 4}, {2, 5}, {3, 7} in (29) and dropping one of the indices
of 6 in (30) means that the converse proof is equivalent to the collusion pattern of N = 7
databases and P ′3 = {{1, 2, 3}, {4, 5, 6, 7}}, which is a milder collusion pattern than P3. The
achievability proof provided in Table IV is optimal but not unique. In fact, the optimal scheme
can be querying any of the following pairs of databases only: (1, 5), (1, 6), (1, 7), (2, 4), (2, 6),
(2, 7), (3, 4), (3, 5), (3, 6). Note that we can not query these pairs of databases: (1, 4), (2, 5), (3, 7)
as they may collude.
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VI. CONCLUSIONS
We have found the capacity of the PIR problem under arbitrary collusion patterns for replicated
databases. We first link the achievable PIR rate and its converse to the solutions of two linear
programming problems. Then, we show that the two seemingly different linear programming
problems have the same optimal value. As a result, the achievable PIR rate and its converse meet,
yielding the capacity. The techniques used in this paper can be applied to find the capacity of
other PIR variants under arbitrary patterns, such as symmetric PIR [21] under arbitrary collusion
patterns [100] and PIR with eavesdropper [68] under arbitrary eavesdropping patterns [101].
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF THEOREM 2
We first present the following lemma which is a generalization of [3, Lemma 1] from square
invertible matrices to rectangle matrices with full row rank. This lemma will be used to prove
that the proposed achievable scheme satisfies the privacy constraint.
Lemma 1 Suppose γ ≤ β ≤ α. Let U1,U2, · · · ,UK ∈ Fα×αq be K random matrices, drawn
independently and uniformly from all α× α full-rank matrices over Fq. Let G1,G2, · · · ,GK ∈
Fγ×βq be K matrices of dimension γ × β with full row rank. Let I1, I2, · · · , IK ∈ N
β×1 be K
index vectors, each containing β distinct indices from [1 : α]. Then,
(G1U1[I1, :],G2U2[I2, :], · · · ,GKUK [IK , :]) ∼ (U1[(1 : γ), :],U2[(1 : γ), :], · · · ,UK [(1 : γ), :]) ,
(31)
where Uk[Ik, :], k ∈ [1 : K] is the β × α matrices comprised of the rows of Uk with indices in
Ik.
Proof:We use the results of [3, Lemma 1] to prove Lemma 1. Form matricesG′1, · · · ,G
′
K ∈
F(β−γ)×βq such that

Gk
G′k

 is a β × β square and invertible matrix, for all k ∈ [1 : K]. This can
be done as G1, · · · ,GK has full row rank. According to [3, Lemma 1], we have


G1
G′1

U1[I1, :], · · · ,

GK
G′K

UK [IK , :]

 ∼ (U1[(1 : β), :], · · · ,UK [(1 : β), :]) . (32)
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Since we have

Gk
G′k

Uk[Ik, :] =

GkUk[Ik, :]
G′kUk[Ik, :]

, k ∈ [1 : K], from (32), we have



G1U1[I1, :]
G′1U1[I1, :]

 , · · · ,

GKUK [IK , :]
G′KUK [IK , :]



 ∼



 U1[(1 : γ), :]
U1[(γ + 1 : β), :]

 , · · · ,

 UK [(1 : γ), :]
UK [(γ + 1 : β), :]



 .
Since the above bigger matrices have the same distribution, its sub-matrices have the same
distribution too, and thus, (31) follows.
A. An Illustrative Example:N = 5,K = 3, P4 = {{1, 2, 3}, {1, 3, 4}, {2, 3, 4}, {1, 2, 5}, {1, 3, 5},
{2, 3, 5}, {4, 5}}
The incidence matrix BP4 for the collusion pattern is
BP4 =


1 1 0 1 1 0 0
1 0 1 1 0 1 0
1 1 1 0 1 1 0
0 1 1 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 1 1 1 1


.
Solving (LP1), we obtain the optimal value S∗ = 7
4
, and the optimal y∗ =
[
1
4
1
4
1
4
1
2
1
2
]T
.
The following achievable scheme is based on (y∗, S∗), but we only use the fact that y∗ is a
rational and feasible solution to (LP1). We do not make use of any of its optimal properties.
Pick a message length L such that the following numbers are integers: L
S∗2
y∗1
S∗
= L
S∗2
y∗2
S∗
=
L
S∗2
y∗3
S∗
= 16
343
L, L
S∗2
y∗4
S∗
= L
S∗2
y∗5
S∗
= 32
343
L, L
S∗2
(S∗−1)
y∗1
S∗
= L
S∗2
(S∗−1)
y∗2
S∗
= L
S∗2
(S∗−1)
y∗3
S∗
= 12
343
L,
L
S∗2
(S∗−1)
y∗4
S∗
= L
S∗2
(S∗−1)
y∗5
S∗
= 24
343
L, and L
S∗2
(S∗−1)2
y∗1
S∗
= L
S∗2
(S∗−1)2
y∗2
S∗
= L
S∗2
(S∗−1)2
y∗3
S∗
=
9
343
L, L
S∗2
(S∗ − 1)2
y∗4
S∗
= L
S∗2
(S∗ − 1)2
y∗5
S∗
= 18
343
L. It will be seen that the above expressions are
the number of symbols downloaded from each dabatase, and thus, they need to be integers. In
this example, we may choose the message length L to be 343.
LetU1,U2,U3 ∈ FL×Lq represent random matrices chosen privately by the user, independently
and uniformly from all L× L full-rank matrices over Fq. Suppose W1 is the desired message.
January 14, 2020 DRAFT
23
For the undesired message W2, we perform the following encoding

x
[2]
K
[2]
1
x
[2]
K
[2]
1 ∪{1}
x
[2]
K
[2]
2
x
[2]
K
[2]
2 ∪{1}


=

MDSS∗α1×α1 0
0 MDSS∗α2×α2

U2 [(1 : L
S∗
)
, :
]
W2, (33)
where K
[2]
1 = {2} and K
[2]
2 = {2, 3}. These two sets are all subsets of [1 : K] that contains index
2 but not 1. We choose α1 and α2 in (33) as
α1 ,
(
1
S∗
)K−1
(S∗ − 1)|K1|−1 L =
16
49
L = 112, (34)
α2 ,
(
1
S∗
)K−1
(S∗ − 1)|K2|−1 L =
12
49
L = 84.
Hence, the MDS codes used above is a (196, 112) MDS code and a (147, 84) MDS code. A
similar encoding is performed on the undesired message W3,

x
[3]
K
[3]
1
x
[3]
K
[3]
1 ∪{1}
x
[3]
K
[3]
2
x
[3]
K
[3]
2 ∪{1}


=

MDSS∗α1×α1 0
0 MDSS∗α2×α2

U3 [(1 : L
S∗
)
, :
]
W3, (35)
where K
[3]
1 = {3} and K
[3]
2 = {2, 3}. Note that the MDS codes used in (35) is the same as that
used in (33).
For the desired message W1, we perform the following encoding

x
[1]
L1
x
[1]
L2
x
[1]
L3
x
[1]
L4

 = U1W1, (36)
where L1 = {1}, L2 = {1, 2}, L3 = {1, 3} and L4 = {1, 2, 3}. These sets are all the subsets of
[1 : K] that contain 1.
In (33), (35) and (36), x
[k]
K , K ⊆ [1 : K], k ∈ [1 : K] is a column vector with length(
1
S∗
)K−1
(S∗ − 1)|K|−1L. With the above definitions, it is straightforward to check that the
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dimensions of the left-hand side is equal to that of the right-hand side in (33), (35) and (36).
For this example, we have x
[1]
{1}, x
[2]
{2} and x
[3]
{3} are all column vectors with length
β1 ,
(
1
S∗
)K−1
L =
16
49
L = 112, (37)
and x
[1]
{1,2}, x
[2]
{1,2}, x
[1]
{1,3}, x
[3]
{1,3}, x
[2]
{2,3}, x
[3]
{2,3} are all column vectors with length
β2 ,
(
1
S∗
)K−1
(S∗ − 1)L =
12
49
L = 84, (38)
and x
[1]
{1,2,3}, x
[2]
{1,2,3}, x
[3]
{1,2,3} are all column vectors with length
β3 ,
(
1
S∗
)K−1
(S∗ − 1)2 L =
9
49
L = 63.
Note that βi = αi, i = 1, 2.
For each K = {1}, {2}, {3}, {1, 2}, {1, 3}, {2, 3}, {1, 2, 3}, generate the query vector
∑
k∈K
x
[k]
K , (39)
which is a column vector with length
(
1
S∗
)K−1
(S∗ − 1)|K|−1L. We will distribute these elements
to the databases according to y∗, which means that a proportion
y∗n
S∗
of
(
1
S∗
)K−1
(S∗ − 1)|K|−1 L
many queries of (39) is from DB n, n ∈ [1 : N ] for each K = {1}, {2}, {3}, {1, 2}, {1, 3}, {2, 3},
{1, 2, 3}. More specifically, if we write out the query table, it would be as in Table V.
Now, we check that the decoding constraint is satisfied. Recall that the undesired message
W2 is encoded as (33), hence, upon receiving x
[2]
{2}(1 : 112), the user may calculate x
[2]
{1,2}(1 :
84) according to the (196, 112) MDS code used. Similarly, for undesired message W3, upon
receiving x
[3]
{3}(1 : 112), the user may calculate x
[3]
{1,3}(1 : 84). Furthermore, upon receiving
x
[2]
{2,3}(1 : 84) + x
[3]
{2,3}(1 : 84), due to the same (147, 84) MDS code used in (33) and (35), the
user may calculate x
[2]
{1,2,3}(1 : 63) + x
[3]
{1,2,3}(1 : 63). Subtracting all the undesired symbols x
[2]
and x[3], we obtain x
[1]
{1}(1 : 112), x
[1]
{1,2}(1 : 84), x
[1]
{1,3}(1 : 84) and x
[1]
{1,2,3}(1 : 63) and calculate
the desired message W1 according to (36). Thus, by downloading 112× 3 + 84× 3 + 63 many
symbols, we obtain 112 + 84× 2 + 63 desired symbols, achieving a rate of 49
93
, which is equal
to
(
1 + 1
S∗
+
(
1
S∗
)2)−1
.
Now, we check that the privacy constraint is satisfied. Recall that P4 = {{1, 2, 3}, {1, 3, 4},
{2, 3, 4}, {1, 2, 5}, {1, 3, 5}, {2, 3, 5}, {4, 5}}. Define the set of indices of x
[k]
K retrieved from
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TABLE V
QUERY TABLE FOR N = 5, K = 3 AND COLLUSION PATTERN P4 CORRESPONDING TO y
∗
DB 1 DB 2 DB3 DB4 DB 5
y∗1
S∗
= 1
7
y∗2
S∗
= 1
7
y∗3
S∗
= 1
7
y∗4
S∗
= 2
7
y∗5
S∗
= 2
7
x
[1]
{1}(1 : 16) x
[1]
{1}(17 : 32) x
[1]
{1}(33 : 48) x
[1]
{1}(49 : 80) x
[1]
{1}(81 : 112)
x
[2]
{2}(1 : 16) x
[2]
{2}(17 : 32) x
[2]
{2}(33 : 48) x
[2]
{2}(49 : 80) x
[2]
{2}(81 : 112)
x
[3]
{3}(1 : 16) x
[3]
{3}(17 : 32) x
[3]
{3}(33 : 48) x
[3]
{3}(49 : 80) x
[3]
{3}(81 : 112)
x
[1]
{1,2}(1 : 12) x
[1]
{1,2}(13 : 24) x
[1]
{1,2}(25 : 36) x
[1]
{1,2}(37 : 60) x
[1]
{1,2}(61 : 84)
+x
[2]
{1,2}(1 : 12) +x
[2]
{1,2}(13 : 24) +x
[2]
{1,2}(25 : 36) +x
[2]
{1,2}(37 : 60) +x
[2]
{1,2}(61 : 84)
x
[1]
{1,3}(1 : 12) x
[1]
{1,3}(13 : 24) x
[1]
{1,3}(25 : 36) x
[1]
{1,3}(37 : 60) x
[1]
{1,3}(61 : 84)
+x
[3]
{1,3}(1 : 12) +x
[3]
{1,3}(13 : 24) +x
[3]
{1,3}(25 : 36) +x
[3]
{1,3}(37 : 60) +x
[3]
{1,3}(61 : 84)
x
[2]
{2,3}(1 : 12) x
[2]
{2,3}(13 : 24) x
[2]
{2,3}(25 : 36) x
[2]
{2,3}(37 : 60) x
[2]
{2,3}(61 : 84)
+x
[3]
{2,3}(1 : 12) +x
[3]
{2,3}(13 : 24) +x
[3]
{2,3}(25 : 36) +x
[3]
{2,3}(37 : 60) +x
[3]
{2,3}(61 : 84)
x
[1]
{1,2,3}(1 : 9) x
[1]
{1,2,3}(10 : 18) x
[1]
{1,2,3}(19 : 27) x
[1]
{1,2,3}(28 : 45) x
[1]
{1,2,3}(46 : 63)
+x
[2]
{1,2,3}(1 : 9) +x
[2]
{1,2,3}(10 : 18) +x
[2]
{1,2,3}(19 : 27) +x
[2]
{1,2,3}(28 : 45) +x
[2]
{1,2,3}(46 : 63)
+x
[3]
{1,2,3}(1 : 9) +x
[3]
{1,2,3}(10 : 18) +x
[3]
{1,2,3}(19 : 27) +x
[3]
{1,2,3}(28 : 45) +x
[3]
{1,2,3}(46 : 63)
colluding set Tm as I
[k]m
K . Then, for the m-th colluding set Tm ∈ P4, m ∈ [1 : M ], the number
of (x
[2]
{2}, x
[2]
{1,2}) retrieved from the databases in Tm, i.e.,
∣∣∣I [2]m{2} ∣∣∣ + ∣∣∣I [2]m{1,2}∣∣∣, and the number of
(x
[3]
{3}, x
[3]
{1,3}) retrieved from the databases in Tm, i.e.,
∣∣∣I [3]m{3} ∣∣∣ + ∣∣∣I [3]m{1,3}∣∣∣, satisfy∣∣∣I [2]m{2} ∣∣∣+ ∣∣∣I [2]m{1,2}∣∣∣ = ∣∣∣I [3]m{3} ∣∣∣+ ∣∣∣I [3]m{1,3}∣∣∣
=
∑
n∈Tm
(β1 + β2)
y∗n
S∗
=
β1 + β2
S∗
(
BTP4y
∗
)
m
(40)
≤
β1 + β2
S∗
(41)
=
(
1
S∗
)K−1
L (42)
= α1, (43)
where in (40), (x)m denote the m-th element of the vector x, (41) follows because y
∗ satisfies
the condition (11) in (LP1), and (42), (43) follows from our definition of βs and αs in (34), (37)
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and (38). The derivation from (40) to (41) clearly shows why in the linear programming (LP1),
we have the constraint (11). Since the number of (x
[2]
{2}, x
[2]
{1,2}) retrieved from Tm is less than
α1, MDSS∗α1×α1
[
I
[2]m
{2}
⋃
I
[2]m
{1,2}, :
]
is full row rank. Similarly, MDSS∗α1×α1
[
I
[3]m
{3}
⋃
I
[3]m
{1,3}, :
]
is full row rank.
By a similar argument, the number of (x
[2]
{2,3}, x
[2]
{1,2,3}) retrieved from the databases in Tm, i.e.,∣∣∣I [2]m{2,3}∣∣∣ + ∣∣∣I [2]m{1,2,3}∣∣∣, and the number of (x[3]{2,3}, x[3]{1,2,3}), i.e., ∣∣∣I [3]m{2,3}∣∣∣+ ∣∣∣I [3]m{1,2,3}∣∣∣ satisfy∣∣∣I [2]m{2,3}∣∣∣ + ∣∣∣I [2]m{1,2,3}∣∣∣ = ∣∣∣I [3]m{2,3}∣∣∣+ ∣∣∣I [3]m{1,2,3}∣∣∣
=
∑
n∈Tm
(β2 + β3)
y∗n
S∗
=
β2 + β3
S∗
(
BTP4y
∗
)
m
≤
β2 + β3
S∗
=
(
1
S∗
)K−1
(S∗ − 1)L = α2.
Thus, matrices MDSS∗α2×α2
[
I
[2]m
{2,3}
⋃
I
[2]m
{1,2,3}, :
]
and MDSS∗α2×α2
[
I
[3]m
{2,3}
⋃
I
[3]m
{1,2,3}, :
]
are both
of full row rank.
Hence, the matrix
Gm2 ,

MDSS∗α1×α1
[
I
[2]m
{2}
⋃
I
[2]m
{1,2}, :
]
0
0 MDSS∗α2×α2
[
I
[2]m
{2,3}
⋃
I
[2]m
{1,2,3}, :
]


is full row rank, and so is
Gm3 ,

MDSS∗α1×α1
[
I
[3]m
{3}
⋃
I
[3]m
{1,3}, :
]
0
0 MDSS∗α2×α2
[
I
[3]m
{2,3}
⋃
I
[3]m
{1,2,3}, :
]

 .
For notational convenience, let I [1]m = I
[1]m
{1}
⋃
I
[1]m
{1,2}
⋃
I
[1]m
{1,3}
⋃
I
[1]m
{1,2,3}, which is the indices
of x[1] received by databases in Tm. Similarly, define I
[2]m = I
[2]m
{2}
⋃
I
[2]m
{1,2}
⋃
I
[2]m
{2,3}
⋃
I
[2]m
{1,2,3}
and I [3]m = I
[3]m
{3}
⋃
I
[3]m
{1,3}
⋃
I
[3]m
{2,3}
⋃
I
[3]m
{1,2,3}. Note that
L
S∗
= α1 + α2 ≥
∣∣I [1]m∣∣ = ∣∣I [2]m∣∣ =∣∣I [3]m∣∣ , τm. Databases in the colluding set Tm sees (x[1]I[1]m , x[2]I[2]m, x[3]I[3]m) with distribution(
U1
[
I [1]m, :
]
W1,G
m
2 U2
[(
1 : L
S∗
)
, :
]
W2,G
m
3 U3
[(
1 : L
S∗
)
, :
]
W3
)
. To use Lemma 1, rewrite
U1
[
I [1]m, :
]
=
[
Iτm 0τm×( LS∗−τm)
]U1 [I [1]m, :]
U1
[
I
[1]m
c , :
]

, where I [1]mc is chosen as LS∗ − τm number
of indices in [1 : L] who are not in I [1]m. Applying Lemma 1, we have(
U1
[
I [1]m, :
]
,Gm2 U2
[(
1 :
L
S∗
)
, :
]
,Gm3 U3
[(
1 :
L
S∗
)
, :
])
∼ (U1[(1 : τm), :],U2[(1 : τm), :],U3[(1 : τm), :]) , ∀m ∈ [1 : M ],
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which proves that the retrieval scheme is private.
B. General Achievability Scheme for arbitrary number of messages K, arbitrary number of
databases N and arbitrary collusion pattern P
Let y =
[
y1 y2 · · · yN
]T
be a feasible and rational solution of (LP1), i.e., y consists of
rational elements, and it satisfies the constraints (11) and (12). Let the value of the objective
function in (LP1) corresponding to y be S, i.e., S =
∑N
n=1 yn.
The encoding of the messages follows the scheme in [3, Section IV.D] closely with NK
replaced by L, the message size, and N
T
replaced with S. For completeness, we state the scheme
here.
Pick message length L such that the following numbers are integers:
(
1
S
)K
(S − 1)k−1Lyn,
k ∈ [1 : K], n ∈ [1 : N ]. Note that the above involves KN numbers which is finite. Such an L
can be found because S and yn, n ∈ [1 : N ] are rational numbers.
Let each message contain L number of symbols from Fq. Let U1,U2, · · · ,UK ∈ FL×Lq
represent random matrices chosen privately by the user, independently and uniformly from all
L× L full-rank matrices over Fq. Suppose Wθ, θ ∈ [1 : K] is the desired message.
For each undesired message k ∈ [1 : K] \ {θ}, we perform the following encoding

x
[k]
K
[k]
1
x
[k]
K
[k]
1 ∪{θ}
x
[k]
K
[k]
2
x
[k]
K
[k]
2 ∪{θ}
...
x
[k]
K
[k]
∆
x
[k]
K
[k]
∆ ∪{θ}


=


MDSSα1×α1 0 0 0
0 MDSSα2×α2 0 0
0 · · ·
. . . 0
0 0 0 MDSSα∆×α∆

Uk
[(
1 :
L
S
)
, :
]
Wk, (44)
where K
[k]
1 ,K
[k]
2 , · · · ,K
[k]
∆ are the distinct labels we assign to all distinct ∆ = 2
K−2 subsets of [1 :
K] that contain k and do not contain θ, and αi, i ∈ [1 : ∆] is defined as
(
1
S
)K−1
(S − 1)|Ki|−1 L.
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For the desired message index θ, we perform the following encoding

x
[θ]
L
[θ]
1
x
[θ]
L
[θ]
2
...
x
[θ]
L
[θ]
δ


= UθWθ, (45)
where L
[θ]
i is the distinct labels of the δ = 2
K−1 subsets of [1 : K] that contain θ.
In (44) and (45), x
[k]
K , K ⊆ [1 : K], k ∈ [1 : K] is a column vector with length
(
1
S
)K−1
(S − 1)|K|−1L. With the above definitions, it is straightforward to check that the dimensions of
the left-hand side is equal to that of the right-hand side in (44) and (45).
For each non-empty subset K ⊆ [1 : K], generate the query vector
∑
k∈K
x
[k]
K , (46)
which is a column vector with length
(
1
S
)K−1
(S − 1)|K|−1L. Up until now, our achievable
scheme follows the scheme in [3, Section IV.D] closely with NK replaced by L, the message
size, and N
T
replaced with S.
Rather than distributing the queries evenly among all databases as in [3, Section IV.D], here
we will distribute these elements to the databases according to y, which means a proportion yn
S
of
(
1
S
)K−1
(S − 1)|K|−1L many queries of (46) is from DB n, n ∈ [1 : N ], for each K ⊆ [1 : K].
Note that this is possible because y satisfies the constraint in (12), i.e., yn ≥ 0, n ∈ [1 : N ].
The decoding constraint is satisfied, following the same proof as [3, Section IV.D], with NK
replaced by L and N
T
replaced by S. So it will not be repeated here. The achievable rate of (13)
also follows by replacing (NK , N
T
) with (L, S) in [3, eqn. (32)-(35)].
Finally, we check that the privacy constraint is satisfied. Define the set of indices of x
[k]
K
retrieved from colluding set Tm as I
[k]m
K . Then, for the m-th colluding set Tm ∈ P , m ∈ [1 : M ],
k ∈ [1 : K] \ {θ}, and K
[k]
i , i ∈ [1 : ∆], the number of (x
[k]
K
[k]
i
, x
[k]
K
[k]
i
⋃
{θ}
) retrieved from the
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databases in Tm satisfy∣∣∣∣I [k]mK[k]i
∣∣∣∣ +
∣∣∣∣I [k]mK[k]i ⋃{θ}
∣∣∣∣
=
∑
n∈Tm
((
1
S
)K−1
(S − 1)|Ki|−1 L+
(
1
S
)K−1
(S − 1)|Ki| L
)
yn
S
=
(
1
S
)K−1
(S − 1)|Ki|−1 L
(
BTPy
)
m
(47)
≤
(
1
S
)K−1
(S − 1)|Ki|−1L (48)
= αi, (49)
where in (47), (x)m denote the m-th element of the vector x, (48) follows because y satisfies
the condition (11) in (LP1), and (49) follows by the definition of αi, which can be found
immediately after (44). Since the number of (x
[k]
K
[k]
i
, x
[k]
K
[k]
i
⋃
{θ}
) retrieved from Tm is less than αi,
MDSSαi×αi
[
I
[k]m
K
[k]
i
⋃
I
[k]m
K
[k]
i
⋃
{θ}
, :
]
is full row rank for all m ∈ [1 : M ], k ∈ [1 : K] \ {θ}, and
K
[k]
i , i ∈ [1 : ∆].
Thus, for all m ∈ [1 : M ], k ∈ [1 : K] \ {θ}, the matrix
G
m
k
,


MDSSα1×α1
[
I
[k]m
K
[k]
1
⋃
I
[k]m
K
[k]
1
⋃
{θ}
, :
]
0 0 0
0 MDSSα2×α2
[
I
[k]m
K
[k]
2
⋃
I
[k]m
K
[k]
2
⋃
{θ}
, :
]
0 0
0 · · ·
.
.
. 0
0 0 0 MDSSα∆×α∆
[
I
[k]m
K
[k]
∆
⋃
I
[k]m
K
[k]
∆
⋃
{θ}
, :
]


is full row rank. For notational convenience, let I [θ]m =
⋃δ
j=1 I
[θ]m
L
[θ]
j
, which is the indices of x[θ] re-
ceived by databases in Tm. Similarly, define I
[k]m =
⋃∆
i=1
(
I
[k]m
K
[k]
i
⋃
I
[k]m
K
[k]
i
⋃
{θ}
)
, k ∈ [1 : K]\{θ},
as the set of indices of x[k] received by databases in Tm for the undesired message k. Note that
L
S
=
∑∆
i=1 αi ≥
∣∣I [θ]m∣∣ = ∣∣I [k]m∣∣ , τm, k ∈ [1 : K]\{θ}. Databases in the colluding set Tm sees(
x
[θ]
I[θ]m
, x
[k]
I[k]m
, k ∈ [1 : K]\{θ}
)
with distribution
(
Uθ
[
I [θ]m, :
]
W1,G
m
k Uk
[(
1 : L
S
)
, :
]
Wk, k ∈
[1 : K] \ {θ}
)
. To use Lemma 1, rewrite Uθ
[
I [θ]m, :
]
=
[
Iτm 0τm×(LS−τm)
]Uθ [I [θ]m, :]
Uθ
[
I
[θ]m
c , :
]

,
where I
[θ]m
c is chosen as
L
S
− τm number of indices in [1 : L] who are not in I
[θ]m. Applying
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Lemma 1, we have (
Uθ
[
I [θ]m, :
]
,Gmk Uk
[(
1 :
L
S
)
, :
]
, k ∈ [1 : K] \ {θ}
)
∼ (Uθ[(1 : τm), :],Uk[(1 : τm), :], k ∈ [1 : K] \ {θ}) ,
which proves that the retrieval scheme is private. Thus, we have proved Theorem 2.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF THEOREM 3
For any PIR scheme, its rate, as defined in (9), satisfies
RP =
L∑N
n=1H(A
[θ]
n )
=
L∑N
n=1H(A
[1]
n )
(50)
≤
L∑N
n=1H(A
[1]
n |Q
[1]
1:N)
(51)
≤
L
H(A
[1]
1:N |Q
[1]
1:N)
, (52)
where (50) is based on (8), and (51) and (52) are both due to conditioning reduces entropy. The
following proof focuses on the lower bound of the denominator H(A
[1]
1:N |Q
[1]
1:N) in (52). We have
H(A
[1]
1:N |Q
[1]
1:N) = H(A
[1]
1:N ,W1|Q
[1]
1:N)−H(W1|A
[1]
1:N , Q
[1]
1:N)
= H(A
[1]
1:N ,W1|Q
[1]
1:N) (53)
= H(W1|Q
[1]
1:N) +H(A
[1]
1:N |W1, Q
[1]
1:N)
= L+H(A
[1]
1:N |W1, Q
[1]
1:N), (54)
where (53) follows from (7), and (54) follows from (5) and (4).
Now, we prove the following induction.
Lemma 2 We have the following induction argument:
S2H(A
[k−1]
1:N |W1:k−1, Q
[k−1]
1:N ) ≥ L+H(A
[k]
1:N |W1:k, Q
[k]
1:N), k = 2, 3, · · · , K.
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Proof: For each Tm ∈ P , m = 1, 2, · · · ,M , we may write
H(A
[k−1]
1:N |W1:k−1, Q
[k−1]
1:N ) = I(Wk:K;A
[k−1]
1:N , Q
[k−1]
1:N |W1:k−1) (55)
≥ I(Wk:K;A
[k−1]
Tm
, Q
[k−1]
Tm
|W1:k−1)
= H(A
[k−1]
Tm
|W1:k−1, Q
[k−1]
Tm
) (56)
= H(A
[k]
Tm
|W1:k−1, Q
[k]
Tm
) (57)
≥ H(A
[k]
Tm
|W1:k−1, Q
[k]
1:N), (58)
where (55) and (56) both follow from (5) and (6), and (57) follows from the privacy constraint
in (8).
We multiply the inequality derived from (55)-(58) for each Tm on both sides by xm, which
is the m-th element of x, and obtain
xmH(A
[k−1]
1:N |W1:k−1, Q
[k−1]
1:N ) ≥ xmH(A
[k]
Tm
|W1:k−1, Q
[k]
1:N), m = 1, 2, · · · ,M. (59)
Note that x satisfies (15) so we do not need to change the direction of the inequality in (59).
Now, we add the M inequalities denoted by (59) together and obtain (18), where we have used
the definition of S2, i.e., S2 =
∑M
m=1 xm. The fact that x is rational and non-negative means that
there exist non-negative integers G1
x
, G2
x
,· · · , GM
x
, Gx, such that each xm can be expressed as
xm =
Gm
x
Gx
, ∀m ∈ [1 : M ]. (60)
Thus, we have (19).
We write a more general summation than that on the right-hand side of (19) as
V∑
v=1
H(A
[k]
T˜v
|W1:k−1, Q
[k]
1:N), (61)
where V is a positive integer, and T˜v ⊆ [1 : N ], for v ∈ [1 : V ]. Note that the summation
on the right-hand side of (19) is a special case of (61) with T˜v = Tm, where m satisfies∑m−1
i=1 G
i
x
+ 1 ≤ v ≤
∑m
i=1G
i
x
, and V =
∑M
m=1G
m
x
, m ∈ [1 : M ]. We have the following
definitions and a lemma regarding the sum (61).
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Definition 1 Define the subscript collection of the sum (61) as
A , {T˜1, T˜2, · · · T˜V }, (62)
where we have collected the subscript of AT˜v of sum (61) to form A.
Definition 2 We say that the sum (61) satisfies the even property with the number G, if the
number of times n appears in its subscript collection A is equal to G for each n ∈ [1 : N ].
Lemma 3 When the sum (61) satisfies the even property with G, we have
V∑
v=1
H(A
[k]
T˜v
|W1:k−1, Q
[k]
1:N) ≥ G ·H(A
[k]
1:N |W1:k−1, Q
[k]
1:N), k = 2, 3, · · · , K. (63)
Proof: For a more fluent reading of the paper, we provide the details of the proof of Lemma
3 in Appendix C, along with an illustrative example. The main idea is an iterated application of
the sub-modular property of the entropy fuction [99].
Going back to the problem at hand, the subscript collection of the right-hand side of (19) is
Ax , {T1, · · · T1,︸ ︷︷ ︸
G1x
T2, · · · T2,︸ ︷︷ ︸
G2x
· · · , TM , · · · TM︸ ︷︷ ︸
GMx
}. (64)
The number of times n appears in (64) is
∑
j∈Dn
Gj
x
, where Dn is the set of indices of colluding
sets in P which include Database n.
In the case of BPx = 1N , the sum on the right-hand side of (19) satisfies the even property
with the number G = Gx. This is because
1 = (BPx)n =
∑
j∈Dn
xj =
∑
j∈Dn
Gj
x
Gx
, ∀n ∈ [1 : N ],
where the last step follows from (60). Hence, applying Lemma 3, we have proved (22) in the
case of BPx = 1N .
In the case of BPx > 1N , we have
1 ≤ (BPx)n =
∑
j∈Dn
xj =
∑
j∈Dn
Gj
x
Gx
, ∀n ∈ [1 : N ].
We arbitrarily delete
∑
j∈Dn
Gj
x
−Gx number of ns from sets in Ax of (64), and obtain a new
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A as
{T 11 , · · · T
G1x
1 ,︸ ︷︷ ︸
G1x
T 12 , · · · T
G2x
2 ,︸ ︷︷ ︸
G2x
· · · , T 1M , · · · T
GMx
M︸ ︷︷ ︸
GMx
}. (65)
Since we are deleting indices, we have T gm ⊆ Tm, g ∈ [1 : G
m
x
], m ∈ [1 : M ]. Hence, the
summation corresponding to (65) lower bounds the summation corresponding to (64), i.e.,
M∑
m=1
Gm
x
H(A
[k]
Tm
|W1:k−1, Q
[k]
1:N) ≥
M∑
m=1
Gmx∑
g=1
H(A
[k]
T gm
|W1:k−1, Q
[k]
1:N). (66)
Since we have deleted
∑
j∈Dn
Gj
x
−Gx number of ns in Ax of (64), and obtained a new A as
(65), the right-hand side of (66) satisfies the even property with the number G = Gx. Applying
Lemma 3, we have
M∑
m=1
Gmx∑
g=1
H(A
[k]
T gm
|W1:k−1, Q
[k]
1:N) ≥ Gx ·H(A
[k]
1:N |W1:k−1, Q
[k]
1:N), k = 2, 3, · · · , K. (67)
From (66) and (67), we have (22) for the case of BPx > 1N too. To make things more clear,
we have included an example of the case BPx > 1N at the end of this subsection.
Thus, when x satisfies BPx ≥ 1N , from (19) and (22), we have
M∑
m=1
xmH(A
[k]
Tm
|W1:k−1, Q
[k]
1:N) ≥ H(A
[k]
1:N |W1:k−1, Q
[k]
1:N), k = 2, 3, · · · , K. (68)
Finally, following from (18) and (68), we have
S2 ·H(A
[k−1]
1:N |W1:k−1, Q
[k−1]
1:N ) ≥ H(A
[k]
1:N |W1:k−1, Q
[k]
1:N)
= H(A
[k]
1:N ,Wk|W1:k−1, Q
[k]
1:N) (69)
= H(Wk|W1:k−1, Q
[k]
1:N) +H(A
[k]
1:N |W1:k, Q
[k]
1:N)
= L+H(A
[k]
1:N |W1:k, Q
[k]
1:N),
where (69) follows from (7). This proves Lemma 2.
Using (52), (54), Lemma 2 and the fact that H(A
[K]
1:N |W1:K , Q
[K]
1:N) = 0, we obtain the result
of Theorem 3.
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A. An example for the case of BPx > 1N
We provide the following example to illustrate how we delete indices to obtain (65) and (66)
in the case of BPx > 1N .
For the collusion pattern of N = 5 databases and P5 = {{1, 3}, {2, 3}, {3, 4}, {1, 5}, {2, 5},
{4, 5}}, the corresponding incidence matrix is
BP5 =


1 0 0 1 0 0
0 1 0 0 1 0
1 1 1 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 1
0 0 0 1 1 1


.
Solving linear programming problem (LP2), the optimal solution is
x∗ =
[
1
2
1
2
1
2
1
2
1
2
1
2
]T
, (70)
and satisfies BP5x
∗ =
[
1 1 3
2
1 3
2
]T
> 1N . In the derivations below, we only use the fact
that x∗ is rational and feasible. We do not make use of the fact that x∗ is optimal.
For this example, with x∗ in (70), we may pick Gx∗ = 2, G
1
x∗
= · · · = G6
x∗
= 1. The sum on
the right-hand side of (19) for this example becomes
H(A
[k]
{1,3}|W1:k−1, Q
[k]
1:N) +H(A
[k]
{2,3}|W1:k−1, Q
[k]
1:N) +H(A
[k]
{3,4}|W1:k−1, Q
[k]
1:N)
+H(A
[k]
{1,5}|W1:k−1, Q
[k]
1:N) +H(A
[k]
{2,5}|W1:k−1, Q
[k]
1:N) +H(A
[k]
{4,5}|W1:k−1, Q
[k]
1:N), (71)
and its associated subscript collection is
{{1, 3}, {2, 3}, {3, 4}, {1, 5}, {2, 5}, {4, 5}}. (72)
Hence, the sum in (71) does not satisfy the even property, as Databases 1,2 and 4 appear 2 times
each, and Databases 3 and 5 appear 3 times each.
Arbitrarily delete
∑
j∈D3
Gj − Gx = 1 number of 3, and
∑
j∈D5
Gj − Gx = 1 number of 5
from (72). There are 3× 3 ways to do this, such as
{{1}, {2, 3}, {3, 4}, {1}, {2, 5}, {4, 5}}, (73)
or {{1, 3}, {2}, {3, 4}, {1, 5}, {2, 5}, {4}} or {{1}, {2, 3}, {3, 4}, {1, 5}, {2, 5}, {4}} etc. All 9
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ways work for the following derivations and we take (73) as an example.
The subscript collection in (73) corresponds to the sum
H(A
[k]
{1}|W1:k−1, Q
[k]
1:N) +H(A
[k]
{2,3}|W1:k−1, Q
[k]
1:N) +H(A
[k]
{3,4}|W1:k−1, Q
[k]
1:N)
+H(A
[k]
{1}|W1:k−1, Q
[k]
1:N) +H(A
[k]
{2,5}|W1:k−1, Q
[k]
1:N) +H(A
[k]
{4,5}|W1:k−1, Q
[k]
1:N), (74)
where it is easy to see that (74) is a lower bound to (71). Furthermore, (74) satisfies the even
property, i.e., the number of times n appears is 2 for n ∈ [1 : 5]. Hence, we have obtained a
lower bound to (71), and this lower bound, i.e., (74), is a sum that satisfies the even property,
and Lemma 3 may then be applied to the sum of (74).
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF LEMMA 3
Consider the sum (61) and its corresponding subscript collection (62), where the sum (61)
satisfies the even property with the number G, i.e., the number of times n appears in A of (62)
is equal to a number G for each n ∈ [1 : N ].
The sub-modular property of the entropy function [99] is
H(A
[k]
I |W1:k−1, Q
[k]
1:N) +H(A
[k]
J |W1:k−1, Q
[k]
1:N)
≥ H(A
[k]
I
⋃
J |W1:k−1, Q
[k]
1:N) +H(A
[k]
I
⋂
J |W1:k−1, Q
[k]
1:N), I,J ⊆ [1 : N ]. (75)
After applying (75) once to the sum of two of the entropy terms of (61), the set I and J will
be replaced by I
⋃
J and I
⋂
J in the lower bound of the sum. Correspondingly, sets I and
J will be replaced by I
⋃
J and I
⋂
J in the subscript collection A associated with the new
sum. Note that the number of times n, n ∈ [1 : N ], appears in (I,J ) and in (I
⋃
J , I
⋂
J )
is the same. Hence, the even property is always preserved after applying the sub-modular lower
bounding of (75). Note also that if I ⊆ J or J ⊆ I, then the lower bounding (75) becomes
trivial. In particular, there is no need to apply (75) when I or J is the empty set or the whole
set [1 : N ].
In the following, we propose an algorithm that iteratively applies the sub-modular lower
bounding of (75) until the desired result, i.e., the right-hand side of (63), is reached, see Algorithm
1. The feasibility and convergence of Algorithm 1 will prove Lemma 3.
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Algorithm 1 is concerned with updating the subscript collection A after each lower bounding.
Since there is a one-to-one correspondence between the subscript collection and its associated
sum, Algorithm 1 is in effect lower bounding the sum in (61) step by step to reach the right-hand
side of (63), which corresponds to the subscript collection A = {[1 : N ], · · · , [1 : N ],︸ ︷︷ ︸
G
φ, · · ·φ︸ ︷︷ ︸
V−G
}.
In each iteration, Algorithm 1 first picks a set a1 ∈ A, that is neither the empty set or the whole
set [1 : N ], and is maximal, in the sense that no other set, except [1 : N ] or a set equal to
itself, contains it. Then, based on the a1 picked, it picks another set a2 ∈ A that is not a subset
of a1 nor the whole set [1 : N ]. Note that since a1 is maximal, which will be proved in the
convergence proof of Algorithm 1, we have that a1 * a2, and a2 * a1. Perform the sub-modular
lower bounding of (75) for I = a1,J = a2 and update A corresponding to the new sum, where
a1 is replaced with the bigger set of a1
⋃
a2 and a2 is replaced with the smaller set of a1
⋂
a2.
In the next iteration, if the new a1 is not the whole set [1 : N ] yet, use it again as a1 and find
a set a2 ∈ A that is not a subset of a1 nor the whole set [1 : N ]. Each iteration will make
a1 bigger and bigger until it becomes the whole set [1 : N ], at which point, we pick another
a1 ∈ A, that is neither the empty set or the whole set [1 : N ], and is maximal, and start the
iterations again. The algorithm iterates until all sets left in A are either empty or the whole set,
i.e., [1 : N ]. Since the sum (61) satisfies the even property with the number G, and with each
iteration, the even property is continually satisfied, when the algorithm ends, the output has to
be of the form A = {[1 : N ], · · · , [1 : N ],︸ ︷︷ ︸
G
φ, · · ·φ︸ ︷︷ ︸
V−G
}.
Algorithm 1: Lower bounding the sum in (61) to reach the right-hand side of (63)
Input: A , {T˜1, T˜2, · · · T˜V }
Output: A = {[1 : N ], · · · , [1 : N ],︸ ︷︷ ︸
G
φ, · · ·φ︸ ︷︷ ︸
V−G
}
Initialization: a1 = φ
1 while ∃a ∈ A such that a 6= [1 : N ] or φ do
2 Form a collection of sets B by removing the sets of [1 : N ] and φ in A
3 If a1 is not in B, pick an a1 ∈ B that is maximal, i.e., it satisfies: there does not exist a
set a′ ∈ B such that a1 ( a′; Else, do nothing
4 pick a set a2 ∈ B where a2 * a1
5 b1 = a1
⋃
a2, b2 = a1
⋂
a2
6 In A, replace ai with bi, i = 1, 2
7 a1 = b1, a2 = b2
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1) An Example illustrating Algorithm 1: :
For the collusion pattern ofN = 5 databases and P6 = {{1, 2}, {2, 3, 4}, {2, 5}, {1, 3, 5}, {1, 4, 5},
{3, 4, 5}}, the corresponding incidence matrix is
BP6 =


1 0 0 1 1 0
1 1 1 0 0 0
0 1 0 1 0 1
0 1 0 0 1 1
0 0 1 1 1 1


.
Solving the linear programming problem (LP2), the optimal solution is
x∗ =
[
1
5
3
5
1
5
2
5
2
5
0
]T
, (76)
and satisfies BP6x
∗ = 1N . Hence, for this example, with the optimal x
∗ in (76), we may pick
Gx∗ = 5, G
1
x∗
= G3
x∗
= 1, G2
x∗
= 3, G4
x∗
= G5
x∗
= 2, G6
x∗
= 0. In the following, we do not use
the optimality of x∗, only that it generates a sum that satisfies the even property.
The right-hand side of (19) becomes
H(A
[k]
{1,2}|W1:k−1, Q
[k]
1:N ) + 3H(A
[k]
{2,3,4}|W1:k−1, Q
[k]
1:N) +H(A
[k]
{2,5}|W1:k−1, Q
[k]
1:N )
+ 2H(A
[k]
{1,3,5}|W1:k−1, Q
[k]
1:N) + 2H(A
[k]
{1,4,5}|W1:k−1, Q
[k]
1:N). (77)
Written in the form of (61), we have
(77) =H(A
[k]
{1,2}|W1:k−1, Q
[k]
1:N) +H(A
[k]
{2,3,4}|W1:k−1, Q
[k]
1:N) +H(A
[k]
{2,3,4}|W1:k−1, Q
[k]
1:N)
+H(A
[k]
{2,3,4}|W1:k−1, Q
[k]
1:N) +H(A
[k]
{2,5}|W1:k−1, Q
[k]
1:N) +H(A
[k]
{1,3,5}|W1:k−1, Q
[k]
1:N)
+H(A
[k]
{1,3,5}|W1:k−1, Q
[k]
1:N) +H(A
[k]
{1,4,5}|W1:k−1, Q
[k]
1:N) +H(A
[k]
{1,4,5}|W1:k−1, Q
[k]
1:N),
(78)
and the corresponding input to Algorithm 1 is A = {{1, 2}, {2, 3, 4}, {2, 3, 4}, {2, 3, 4}, {2, 5},
{1, 3, 5}, {1, 3, 5}, {1, 4, 5}, {1, 4, 5}}. Note that the number of times n appears in A is 5, for
n ∈ [1 : 5]. Thus, the summation in (78) satisfies the even property.
In the first iteration, B = A in Step 2 of Algorithm 1. In Step 3, Pick a1 = {1, 2} ∈ B which
is maximal and further pick a2 = {2, 3, 4} ∈ B in Step 4 which is not a subset of a1. Applying
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the sub-modular property of the entropy function on the two underlined terms in (78), we have
(78) ≥H(A
[k]
{1,2,3,4}|W1:k−1, Q
[k]
1:N ) +H(A
[k]
{2}|W1:k−1, Q
[k]
1:N) +H(A
[k]
{2,3,4}|W1:k−1, Q
[k]
1:N)
+H(A
[k]
{2,3,4}|W1:k−1, Q
[k]
1:N) +H(A
[k]
{2,5}|W1:k−1, Q
[k]
1:N) +H(A
[k]
{1,3,5}|W1:k−1, Q
[k]
1:N)
+H(A
[k]
{1,3,5}|W1:k−1, Q
[k]
1:N) +H(A
[k]
{1,4,5}|W1:k−1, Q
[k]
1:N) +H(A
[k]
{1,4,5}|W1:k−1, Q
[k]
1:N),
(79)
which corresponds to the newA = {{1, 2, 3, 4}, {2}, {2, 3, 4}, {2, 3, 4}, {2, 5}, {1, 3, 5}, {1, 3, 5},
{1, 4, 5}, {1, 4, 5}}. The new a1 = {1, 2, 3, 4} and a2 = {2}. Note that the number of times n
appears in A is still 5, for n ∈ [1 : 5]. Thus, the summation in (79) also satisfies the even
property.
In Iteration 2, B = A in Step 2 of Algorithm 1. In Step 3, since a1 = {1, 2, 3, 4} is not the
whole set and thus in B, we continue using this as a1, and further pick a2 = {2, 5} in Step 4
which is not a subset of a1. Applying the sub-modular property of the entropy function on the
two underlined terms in (79), we have
(79) ≥H(A
[k]
[1:5]|W1:k−1, Q
[k]
1:N) +H(A
[k]
{2}|W1:k−1, Q
[k]
1:N) +H(A
[k]
{2,3,4}|W1:k−1, Q
[k]
1:N)
+H(A
[k]
{2,3,4}|W1:k−1, Q
[k]
1:N) +H(A
[k]
{2}|W1:k−1, Q
[k]
1:N) +H(A
[k]
{1,3,5}|W1:k−1, Q
[k]
1:N)
+H(A
[k]
{1,3,5}|W1:k−1, Q
[k]
1:N) +H(A
[k]
{1,4,5}|W1:k−1, Q
[k]
1:N) +H(A
[k]
{1,4,5}|W1:k−1, Q
[k]
1:N),
(80)
which corresponds to the new A = {[1 : 5], {2}, {2, 3, 4}, {2, 3, 4}, {2}, {1, 3, 5}, {1, 3, 5},
{1, 4, 5}, {1, 4, 5}}. The new a1 = [1 : 5] and a2 = {2}. Again, the number of times n appears
in A is still 5, for n ∈ [1 : 5]. Thus, the summation in (80) also satisfies the even property.
In Iteration 3, B = {{2}, {2, 3, 4}, {2, 3, 4}, {2}, {1, 3, 5}, {1, 3, 5}, {1, 4, 5}, {1, 4, 5}} in Step
2 of Algorithm 1. In Step 3, since a1 = [1 : 5] is the whole set and thus not in B, we pick
another a1 = {2, 3, 4} which is maximal. Further pick a2 = {1, 3, 5} in Step 4 which is not a
subset of a1. Applying the sub-modular property of the entropy function on the two underlined
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terms in (80), we have
(80) ≥H(A
[k]
[1:5]|W1:k−1, Q
[k]
1:N) +H(A
[k]
{2}|W1:k−1, Q
[k]
1:N) +H(A
[k]
[1:5]|W1:k−1, Q
[k]
1:N)
+H(A
[k]
{2,3,4}|W1:k−1, Q
[k]
1:N) +H(A
[k]
{2}|W1:k−1, Q
[k]
1:N) +H(A
[k]
{3}|W1:k−1, Q
[k]
1:N)
+H(A
[k]
{1,3,5}|W1:k−1, Q
[k]
1:N) +H(A
[k]
{1,4,5}|W1:k−1, Q
[k]
1:N) +H(A
[k]
{1,4,5}|W1:k−1, Q
[k]
1:N),
(81)
which corresponds to the new A = {[1 : 5], {2}, [1 : 5], {2, 3, 4}, {2}, {3}, {1, 3, 5}, {1, 4, 5},
{1, 4, 5}}. The new a1 = [1 : 5] and a2 = {3}. Again, the number of times n appears in A is
still 5, for n ∈ [1 : 5]. Thus, the summation in (81) also satisfies the even property.
We carry on like this with the following iterations, and at the end each iteration, we have the
updated subscript collection A being
Iteration 4: A = {[1 : 5], {2}, [1 : 5], [1 : 5], {2}, {3}, {3}, {1, 4, 5}, {1, 4, 5}};
Iteration 5: A = {[1 : 5], {2, 3}, [1 : 5], [1 : 5], {2}, φ, {3}, {1, 4, 5}, {1, 4, 5}};
Iteration 6: A = {[1 : 5], [1 : 5], [1 : 5], [1 : 5], {2}, φ, {3}, φ, {1, 4, 5}};
Iteration 7: A = {[1 : 5], [1 : 5], [1 : 5], [1 : 5], {2, 3}, φ, φ, φ, {1, 4, 5}};
Iteration 8: A = {[1 : 5], [1 : 5], [1 : 5], [1 : 5], [1 : 5], φ, φ, φ, φ},
where the underlined set is a1 in the next iteration and the overlined set is what we pick to be a2,
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which is not a subset of a1, in the next iteration. This corresponds to the following derivations:
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Note that the even property is preserved in each step of the lower bounding.
2) Feasibility proof of Algorithm 1: Algorithm feasibility depends on whether we are able to
find the required sets in Steps 3 and 4. In Step 3, if a1 from the previous iteration is not the
whole set [1 : N ], we will continue to use it as a1 in the next iteration. In the case where a1 from
the previous iteration is the whole set [1 : N ], we need to pick another a1 ∈ B that is maximal.
We prove that such an a1 can always be found by contradiction: suppose no such a1 ∈ B is
found, which means that for every set in B, you can find another set that strictly contains it.
But this can not be true as the number of sets in B is finite. Thus, we have proved that we can
always find a set a1 that satisfies the condition in Step 3.
We will prove the feasibility of Step 4 by contradiction: suppose no such set a2 can be found,
which means that all the other sets in B are either the same as a1, or a subset of a1. We know
that a1 is not the whole set because it belongs to B, so there is at least one index j0 ∈ [1 : N ],
such that j0 /∈ a1. Also, a1 is not the empty set, so there exists at least one index j1 ∈ [1 : N ],
such that j1 ∈ a1. The number of times j0 appears in B is zero as B only contains sets that are
either the same as a1, or a subset of a1. But the number of times j1 appears in B is at least
1, as it is contained in a1. Hence, the number of times j0 appears in B is strictly less than the
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number of times j1 appears in B, and as a consequence, the number of times j0 appears in A
is strictly less than the number of times j1 appears in A, violating the even property. However,
the even property should always hold when applying the sub-modular lower bounding of (75),
which means that it is satisfied at each iteration of the algorithm. Thus, we have arrived at a
contradiction, which means that the a2 in Step 4 can always be found.
3) Convergence proof of Algorithm 1: First, we claim that Step 3 always gives us a set a1,
that is maximal. We start the iteration by picking an a1 ∈ B that is maximal. As the iterations
goes on, it becomes bigger and bigger while the other sets either remain the same or become
smaller. Hence, it will remain maximal in each iteration until it reaches the whole set, [1 : N ],
at which point, a new maximal a1 will be picked and it will also remain maximal during future
iterations and so on and so forth. So Step 3 always gives us a set a1 which is maximal.
Since a1 is maximal in each iteration, in Step 4, we can not find an a that strictly contains a1.
Since Step 4 also ensures that we do not pick an a2 that is a subset of a1, we have a1 * a2 and
a2 * a1 in each iteration. Thus, the size of a1 gets increased by at least one in each iteration. So
each maximal set picked from B takes at most N − 1 iterations to reach the whole set [1 : N ].
Since there are at most V sets in A, Algorithm 1 will stop after at most (N − 1)V iterations.
By proving the feasibility and convergence of Algorithm 1, we have shown that the algorithm
can indeed change A , {T˜1, T˜2, · · · T˜V } step by step to A = {[1 : N ], · · · , [1 : N ],︸ ︷︷ ︸
G
φ, · · ·φ︸ ︷︷ ︸
V−G
},
which means that we can lower-bound the sum of (61) to reach the right-hand side of (63).
Thus, Lemma 3 is proved.
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